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WEIGHING AND IMPLEMENTING THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
STEPHEN ELLMANN*
Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development, New York Law School
In this essay I hope to clarify the meaning of the right to counsel guaranteed
by South Africa's Constitution,' and to suggest some potential paths for its
enforcement to the extent that enforcement is necessary. All of this is certainly
part of assessing the new Constitution's impact on access to justice, but access
to justice entails much more than access to legal representation, and the new
Constitution's impact in this sphere goes well beyond the developments that I
will focus on here. Most obviously, the wide range of substantive constitu-
tional rights that South Africans now enjoy all provide a basis for seeking
justice. The Constitution's broad standing provisions potentially provide
access to justice, via third party representatives, for many people whose valid
claims might otherwise go unheard. And each specification of rights before
courts or administrative tribunals helps ensure access to justice as well.
Within the sphere of access to counsel, I will look frequently to United
States constitutional decisions, which, I believe, offer useful guidance for
South Africa. But I do not for a moment suggest that the United States offers
South Africa the model for the constitutional assurance of access to justice. The
truth is that there is no simple formula that determines what access to justice
requires. Much of what I will say here seeks to draw on both South African
and American constitutional law to clarify two issues that make under-
standing and enforcing constitutional mandates of access to justice difficult,
even perplexing, for both countries. The first is the significance of inevitable
limits on state resources in assessing what access to justice our constitutions
require. The second is the role of the different branches of government in
allocating resources when more access to justice must be achieved.
There are also more concrete reasons for disclaiming the idea that the
United States provides the model for South African practice. Our own
achievements in this sphere, unfortunately, have been mixed. Moreover, we do
not now face the sweeping tasks of transformation that South Africa is facing;
* BAJD (Harvard). This paper has benefited from the comments of participants in the South African Law
Journal 1884 - 2004jubilee Conference: The Impact of the Constitution on South African Law: Ten Years On, in
October 2003, and at a subsequent New York Law School faculty workshop, and especially from the insights
ofGeoffBudlender. I am very grateful also to Theunis Roux for very helpful advice at the start of this project,
and to all of the editors of the South African LawJournal for all the work they did to make this conference both
fascinating and fun. Finally, I thank Parveen Husain for valuable research assistance.
I Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996.
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if our solutions were more comprehensive in our own country they might
still not be transferable to yours. Finally, I do not want to be understood to be
criticizing the progress this country has made toward realizing access to
justice over the last ten years. On the contrary, my sense is that the Legal Aid
Board has not only rectified its own internal problems but also set out aggres-
sively to expand the provision of legal services to South Africans accused of
crime and, in some circumstances, to those with civil lawsuits. Indeed, I will
suggest, at the end of this essay, that this programmatic success may well
justify more judicial deference to the legislative and administrative efforts
underway than may now be appropriate in the United States.
Nevertheless, my understanding is also that there is still a lot to be done to
achieve full access to justice in South Africa, in particular with respect to the
right to legal representation. It isfair to say that South Africa's Constitution
does not fully guarantee .access to counsel to either criminal or civil litigants.
The Constitution does ensure that people in detention or imprisonment and
people facing criminal trial have the right to see a lawyer,2 but it does not
promise anyone a lawyer at state expense unless 'substantial injustice would
otherwise result'. 3 The leading Constitutional Court case on the meaning of
this language strongly implies that, in many criminal cases, the requirement of
potential 'substantial injustice' would not be met, and the accused would thus
not be entitled to the appointment of counsel paid for by- the state. 4 In civil
cases, there is. no explicit textual promise of appointed counsel at all, and
although Nkuzi5 nevertheless derived such a right from, presumably, the
guarantee of 'a fair pubhc hearing before a court or ... another independent
and impartial tribunal or forum',6 its reasoning has apparently not yet.been
extended to other groups of civil litigants -besides the labour tenants and
occupiers whose situation Nkuzi itself addressed.
In practice, the Legal Aid Board offers representation in many -cases in
which courts have not yet found a right to legal assistance at state expense.
Everyone facing more than three months' imprisonment at a criminal trial is
considered to face a risk of substantial injustice without the aid of a lawyer.7
2 Section 35(2)(b) (detainees and people under imprisonment) and s 35(3)(0 (accused persons) of the
Constitution. There does not appear to be any explicit guarantee of a right to representation in civil matters
generally.
3 Sections 35(2)(c) and 3 5 (3)(g). Children have a similar right to have legal representation at state expense,
under s 28(l)(l).
' S v Vermaas; S v Du Plessis 1995 (3) SA 292 (CC); 1995 (7) BCLR 851 (CC). The late DidcottJ wrote
here that the 'substantial injustice' standard, as embodied in s '25(3)(e) of the interim Constitution
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993), entailed an enquiry into the 'ranifications
[of the case] and their complexity or simplicity, the accused person's aptitude or ineptitude to fend for himself
or herself in a matter of those dimensions, how grave the consequences of a conviction may look, and any
other factor that needs to be evaluated in the determination of the likelihood or unlikelihood that, if the trial
were to proceed without a lawyer for the defence, the result would be "substantial injustice" (at para 15). If
every person facing a serious criminal charge was for that reason alone entitled to a lawyer at state expense,
most of these questions would never need to be addressed.
5 Nkuzi Development Association v Government of the Republic of South Africa 2002 (2) SA 733 (LCC).
I Section 34 of the Constitution.
7 Legal Aid Board Legal Aid Guide (2001) para 3.1.1. The Guide. is available at wua.vpmg.og.za/docs/
2002/appendices/O20212LegalAid.htm [last accessed 16 April 2004].
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Moreover, a considerable range of civil litigants is eligible for Legal Aid,
including, but by no means limited to, the people covered by Nkuzi.8 This is
impressively generous, but another constraint (and a perfectly appropriate
one) remains: income-eligibility rules. These rules are also quite generous; I
was told that by the end of 2003 they would probably allow people to receive
legal aid if they have incomes of up to R1 750 per month for a single person,
and up to R2 500 per month for a married person.9 These limits presumably
make a great many South Africans eligible, but the limits still mean that many
people are probably neither eligible for Legal Aid nor in a position to hire
lawyers, at least not without great difficulty. 10 Ironically, the very generosity
of the rules on case types and income limits may create another problem,
namely an excessive caseload. I do not have statistics to prove this point, but
American experience suggests that in South Africa, as in our country,
caseloads for Legal Aid lawyers may be so high that the quality of representa-
tion suffers.
At the same time, it is not self-evident that access to justice should be
extended further than it has been. No doubt better, and more widely available,
legal representation would be a good thing (at least up to a point - the point
when matters that might best have been resolved outside of courts become
needless litigation). South African litigants could have readier access to
state-funded lawyers who would have time to focus on their cases, as well as
resources with which to focus effectively, in the form of experience, training,
access to support services, access to experts, and similar tools. But this good
thing would come at a price. Say that the price is R500 million - approxim-
ately a doubling of the current Legal Aid Board budget.II Is this where South
Africa's next R500 million should go? Is it where R500 million currently
being spent on something else should now be applied instead? And how
should a court answer such questions? I want to explore here this particular
instance of the general issue of whether, since all rights have costs, courts must
weigh costs in deciding whether to protect rights.
There is a second socio-economic question that immediately follows the
first. Suppose that courts do decide to extend the sphere of access to justice.
How can they do this? Must courts begin issuing cheques payable at the state
treasury, or are there better ways for them to proceed? If courts do try other
ways, and they fail, can they issue those cheques payable at the state treasury?
On this question, more pragmatic than philosophical, it may surprise South
8 These include litigants in labour relations matters (ibid para 3.4), a variety of family law matters (ibid
paras 3.3.1.12,3.3.1.13 and 3.6.2), and asylum cases. The Legal Aid Guide identifies three priorities for legal
aid: those expressly entitled to representation at state expense under the constitution; 'vulnerable groups,
particularly women and children'; and 'the landless' (ibid chap 3, Introduction).
9 Personal communication to the author from Peter Brits, Legal Support Services Executive, Legal Aid
Board (26 September 2003).
1o I take it that this is so even though the Legal Aid Board authorizes discretionary exceptions from its
income limits for people expressly covered by the Constitution's guarantees of state-provided counsel to
avoid substantial injustice (ibid).
" The annual budget for the last fiscal year is reported as R490 million in Ranjeni Munusamy 'Treason
trial finally goes ahead' Sunday Times 22 June 2003.
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African readers that United States experience offers a number of suggestions
- but so I will try to show.
LIMITED RESOURCES, LIMITED JUSTICE
Let us begin with the first question, which might be restated this way: What
should courts think about when they consider extending access to justice?
More to the point: Should they think about money?
It is clear, of course, that access to counsel is costly, as I have already
remarked. Indeed, every right is costly, as Holmes and Sunstein have argued in
The Cost of Rights.12 Even the right to be represented by a lawyer at your own
expense is costly - to the government, that is, as well as to you - because
enforcing it requires an elaborate state structure, the court system itself, which
can exist only at considerable state expense.
Holmes and Sunstein argue that society should become more attentive to
the cost of rights, and they appear to believe that judges, in particular, should
do so as well.13 They do not specify, howeverjust how judges should do this.
The most straightforward approach in the context of the right to counsel
would presumably be for judges assessing whether to extend this right to ask
how much it would cost.
Perhaps they should, and perhaps they inevitably will. But this is not what
the South African constitutional text at first blush calls for. There are rights in
South Africa's Constitution that are guaranteed only in the sense that 'the
state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve [their] progressive realisation' - such socio-economic
rights as the right to housing, and to health care, food, water and social
security.1 4 But the right to have counsel appointed at state expense is not
presented in these terms. Instead, in each of the constitutional sections
securing this right, we are told that a legal practitioner is to be appointed at
state expense 'if substantial injustice would otherwise result'. 15 Clearly, the
courts are being told here to measure justice rather than cost.
Now it might be answered that justice includes cost. It is only unjust to
send a man to prison without a lawyer, or without a lawyer who has enough
time to handle the case with care, if spending money on this is the best use of
society's available resources. As a general moral proposition, I accept that what
isjust depends in part on what is affordable. Even as a matter of morality alone,
however, this proposition takes us only so far. What is affordable is not written
in stone, but is instead in good measure a product of social choice; a polity that
refuses to tax itself will be 'unable' to afford much of what it might want to
12 Stephen Holmes & Cass R Sunstein The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes (1999).
'3 At 224-9.
4 Sections 26(2) (housing) and 27(2) (health care, food, water and social security) of the Constitution.
Cf ss 24(b) (environmental protection 'through reasonable legislative and other measures') and 29(1)(b)
('further education [i e beyond a basic educationi, 'which the state, through reasonable measures, must make
progressively available and accessible').
15 Sections 28(1)(h),35(2)(c) and 35(3)(g).
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purchase. Even assuming that we have drawn on our resources as much as we
should, and that we have allocated what we have to spend in an unimpeach-
able manner, the remaining unfaimesses may still be deeply troubling. If, say,
we believe that convicted criminals should only be sentenced to prison after
an impartial investigation of their social background, but we cannot afford to
have such investigations done, we may decide that we must imprison people
without the very investigation that we consider essential to wise decisions on
imprisonment. If so, it seems more candid to describe what we have done as
an unavoidable, even tragic, injustice rather than to use its unavoidability as a
basis for calling it just.
All that, however, is a matter of moral enquiry. The Constitution does not
direct the courts to undertake an open-ended moral enquiry into the
appropriateness of providing legal representation at state expense. Instead, it
offers a standard - the avoidance of 'substantial injustice' - which I suggest
is best read as embodying a constitutional resolution of this moral problem.
On this reading, the Constitution is not asking courts to factor cost into their
assessment ofjustice; instead, it is asking them to assess justice itself, independ-
ent of cost, and to incur the costs necessary to avoid an unacceptable -
'substantial' - level of injustice. The Constitution has, in effect, already
'costed out' injustice, and decided that it is worth the money to eliminate
'substantial injustice'. All that is left for the courts is to determine whether the
litigants before them do face the prospect of that level of injustice.
To read the Constitution this way may accurately reflect original intent.
On this score, Azhar Cachalia and Anton Steenkamp write that the.
'substantial injustice' standard 'was clearly motivated by concerns that an
unqualified right would place too onerous a burden on state funding, the legal
profession and the courts'. 16
Perhaps more importantly, this historical inference coincides with an
appropriate assessment of courts' ability to assess costs, on the one hand, and
justice, on the other. If the 'cost of rights' question is 'can we afford to remedy
this unfairness?', courts are not in a good position to answer it. Indeed, in.
the context where this question is most directly posed by the Constitution -
the socio-economic rights which the government is called upon to realize
only progressively, within the constraints of available resources - the
Constitutional Court has by no means undertaken to offer general answers to
questions of what programmes the country can afford, and in what order. In
Grootboom's words, '[a] court considering reasonableness will not enquire
whether other more desirable or favourable measures could have been
adopted, or whether public money could have been better spent'. 17 As
IS Azhar Cachalia & Anton Steenkamp 'Detained and arrested persons' in Dennis Dacis, Halton
Cheadle & Nicholas Haysom (eds) Fundamental Rights in the Constitution: Commentary and Cases (1997) 164
at 191.
17 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para 41. See also Minister of
Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) para 37. Where the state's policies
accomplish the tragic tasks of allocation in a reasonable manner, Soobramoney makes clear that they will be
upheld. See Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC); 1997 (12) BCLR 1696
(CC) para 29.
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striking and far-reaching as the court's socio-economic rights jurisprudence
is, these decisions have granted relief only on grounds that permit decision
without answering the global iquestion of 'what- can we- afford?' The state's
policy on anti-retrovirals was concededly not compelled by cost considera-
tions;18 the flaw in the housing policy at issue in Grootboom was not that the
state was spending insufficiently, but that it had shaped a policy that was
intolerably inattentive to the needs of the most desperately deprived.19
Though the Constitutional Court has taken the requirement of reasonable-
ness very'seriously, it has righdy left a large sphere of choice in the hands of the
democratically elected representatives of the people.
In short, where the Constitutional Court has understood the text to place
on it a duty to judge, in some measure, what can and must be done within
available resources, the court has stopped well short of attempting to answer
the global question of what can be afforded. To call on the judiciary to answer
this intractable question when the constitutional text does not seem to pose it
would be a mistake. In the context of the right to legal representation,
focusing on the question of what we can afford would be especially odd
because the text does by its terms pose a quite distinct question, and one with
which courts are very familiar - namely, whether what is happening before
their eyes is or is not a 'substantial injustice'.
But it might be argued, in response, that courts should consider the cost of
rights,just not by undertaking a serious enquiry into what society as a whole
can afford. Instead, the courts might ask, in an intuitive manner, 'is it worth the
money?' If'the answer is 'no', then no, substantial injustice has been
committed. This question is, undeniably, much simpler than the global
budgetary assessment we have just been considering. Moreover, attempting to
estimate how much money really is at stake does at least give us a sense of the
magnitude of the commitment we are contemplating. These estimates may be
erroneous - as a general proposition, courts are probably not particularly
good at budgetary predictions, and no one is perfect at them - but we might
respond to those problems by trying to improve the quality of the predictions
rather than by dispensing with them altogether.20
The simplicity of the question 'is it worth the money?' is, however,
beguiling. The question seems to have two possible meanings. One is 'Is the
right to counsel worth obtaining compared to other goods that society could
purchase instead?' Now, it is quite possible that a court could offer fragments
of an answer to this question: perhaps the right to counsel is less important, for
example, than the right to adequate interpreters who will ensure that the
accused knows what is being said in the trial. But this comparison of the value
of interpreters and lawyers is not very helpful (even assuming it is right),
because the next question has to be, 'can we afford both?' Ultimately this
1s Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) supra note 17 para 71.
19 Grootboom supra note 17 paras 64-5.
20 So, I take it, Holmes & Sunstein supra note 12 at 255 suggest.
324 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL
question becomes the one that we have already seen that courts are in no
position to answer, namely 'what can we afford overall?' 21
The alternative is that the question 'is it worth the money?' is somehow not
a comparative question, and instead means 'is it intrinsically worth the money?'
Intrinsic worth is not easy to measure, but there are surely occasions when we
all believe there are usable answers to this question. In normal life, candy bars
are not worth huge sums of money. There may be exceptions even to
propositions this plain, but if we can provide answers that cover the normal
range of situations that will come before courts, we will have done enough to
provide a workable basis for decisions.
The intrinsic value of the right to counsel, however, is far harder to
measure, let alone monetize. We know that those who can afford to hire
counsel do so very frequently, while those with less money must usually make
do without legal representation. But since, by assumption, we have already
disclaimed the idea of asking the courts to seriously answer the question 'is it
affordable?', I think we must acknowledge that courts will have little economic
foundation for saying whether spending societal resources on the right to
counsel is worth it. This spending might well be 'worth it' if society is rich
enough, and not worth it if society is not rich enough, but how rich society is,
in this context, is the very question courts cannot answer. Oddly, therefore,
giving a figure for the cost of any given implementation of the right to
counsel may give us a sense that we have taken the measure of the reform
- and yet that sense may be largely illusion.
None of this is quite sufficient to demonstrate that costs should be given no
consideration whatsoever. The reality is that courts contemplating potentially
costly orders will never be able to shield their eyes from the size of the bill
completely as they decide what justice calls for, even if they should. Perhaps it
is also fair to say that although no comprehensive, theoretically satisfying
answers to the question of 'what is it worth?' are possible, courts may derive
some intuitive guidance from reflecting on costs. But this guidance will often
be Delphic, resting on uncertain economic estimates and profoundly
ambiguous intersections of human value and economic cost. The question of
what is just or unjust is undeniably a very hard one, but that is the question
21 In Mathews v Eldridge 424 US 319 (1976) at 328, the United States Supreme Court, taking note of
what it predicted would be substantial costs from increased due process rights in the administration of the
social security disability benefit program, commented that 'the cost of protecting those whom the
preliminary administrative process has identified as likely to be found undeserving may in the end come out
of the pockets of the deserving since resources available for any particular program of social welfare are not
unlimited.' This observation seems less ajudgement about what the United States could afford overall than a
pragmatic prediction about the likely impact of increasing demands on a particular part of the social service
budget. Such predictions are not irrelevant to measuring the cost of rights, and indeed are integral to the
deference rightly accorded to legislative efforts to achieve broad socio-economic rights mandates. But these
predictions in effect substitute thejudgment of the other branches of government about 'what we can afford'
for the judiciary's own assessment, and so they seem particularly prone to devaluing the judiciary's own
potentially counter-majoritarian assessments of the demands ofjustice. Of course, these predictions may also
be wrong; one scholar called this one 'speculation' Jerry L Mashaw 'The Supreme Court's due process
calculus for administrative adjudication in Matliews . Eldridge: Three factors in search of a theory of value'
(1976) 44 Univ of Chicago LR 28 at 46).
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South African courts have been asked to focus on, and costs willnot provide a
firm basis for its answer. The real content of the question of'is it worth it?' in
the context of the constitutional standard of 'substantial injustice' should in
the end be seen as primarily non-economic - not, 'how much does this
cost?' but, rather, 'how much does this help?'
It is a different question whether courts should focus on costs under s 36 of
the Constitution as a ground for limitation of rights. If, as Geoff Budlender
plausibly suggests, 22 the current limitations on access to counsel have been
effected by a 'law of general application', as the opening words of s 36 require,
the question is whether the limits created by that law can be justified by cost
considerations.
In principle, the answer might be 'yes'. When we address limitations on
rights, we are no longer denying that rights have been limited, and so the
arguments I have made for excluding costs from the assessment of substantial
injustice are no longer in play. The limitations question is, precisely, whether
an acknowledged substantial injustice can be tolerated because it is 'reason-
able andjustifiable in an open and democratic society'. 2 3 There is no point in
denying the undeniable: rights do cost money, and they cannot all be fully
honoured. Resources are not infinite anywhere, but in South Africa the
problem ofscarcity is acute. Given that, saving money for other vital rights and
needs should be ajustification for limiting rights. To pay for Nevirapine might
well be more important, for example, than avoiding unjust convictions
leading to short terms of imprisonment.
But should costs be given the same consideration in this context as they
would in a case dealing with, say, the right of access to health care? If all rights
have costs, then in a sense all rights are socio-economic, but it seems to me that
in the South African Constitution, some rights are more socio-economic
than others.
To quote again from the constitutional text, what the state is required to do,
for housing, health care, food, water and social security (and somewhat
similarly for the environment and for education beyond the 'basic' level), is to
'take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources,
to achieve the progressive realisation of this right'. 24 This language reflects a
recognition that full realization of the right is currently completely infeasible,
and implicitly points to a willingness to tolerate prolonged deprivations of
housing, health care and so on, as long as the state is moving toward their
realization. As the Constitutional Court recently emphasized, '[i]t is
impossible to give everyone access even to a 'core' service [in the area of
socio-economic rights] immediately'. 25 Moreover, 'the courts are not
institutionally equipped to make the wide-ranging factual and political
22 Geoff Budlender 'Access to justice' (2004) 121 SALJ 339 at 347.
23 Section 36(1) of the Constitution.
24 Sections 26(2) and 27(2). Cfss 24(b) and 29(1)(b).
25 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) supra note 17 para 35.
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enquiries necessary for determining what the minimum core standards ...
should be'. 26
There is no such sweeping language of limitation attached to the right to
counsel in the constitutional text, or to any of the other civil and political
rights the Constitution guarantees. I take this to mean that the Constitution
does not, in fact, simply accept the continued existence of substantial injustice
in criminal cases for a prolonged period. Similarly, I take it that the Con-
stitution demands more than mere progress toward the elimination of denials
of the right to legal representation at state expense that work 'substantial
injustice'.
Cost may still justify failure to achieve substantial justice, but not readily
and not well. To put this more concretely: so far as the constitutional text
indicates, cost is no better a justification for substantial injustice than it is for,
say, a denial of the right to vote. Mounting elections costs money, and
there may be monetary justifications for some limits on the right to vote
- but not many. The same is true, it seems, for limits on the right to legal
representation. 27
Even this may yield too much ground. Consider, for example, the right to
be free from torture.28 Suppose that a prison guard employed by the state
actually tortures a prisoner. The prisoner sues the state, and the state defends
by saying that it had carefully trained and supervised the prison employees,
and that it could not have prevented this unfortunate event except by vastly
more elaborate surveillance of the staff, at a prohibitive expense. That may be a
good reason why the state should not be ordered to improve its surveillance
systems, but it does not seem like a good reason to deny the tortured prisoner
damages for the constitutional wrong he has suffered. To put the point more
generally: even though no right can be perfectly secured except at infinite
cost, individual violations of some rights may always demand remedy.
It is quite plausible to say the imposition of 'substantial injustice' is such a
right. 'Substantial injustice', to be sure, is not a self-defining term; but choose
whatever definition makes most sense to you and ask whether, if the events
that satisfy that definition take place, they should go unremedied. Say, for
example, that you define substantial injustice as 'trial errors that make it more
likely than not that an innocent person has been convicted', or errors that
create 'a reasonable probability . .. that the result of the proceeding would
have been different'. 29 Could one say to that individual, 'Sorry, but you'll
just have to serve out your sentence'?
26 Paragraph 37.
27 This argument holds even if cost is properly factored into the assessment of 'substantial injustice',
contrary to what I have argued above. Once 'substantial injustice' is found, with or without use of costs as a
consideration, the text suggests no further role for costs as a basis for limiting this right than for limiting the
right to vote or a host of other rights that all, inevitably, cost money to honour.
28 Sections 12(1)(d) of the Constitution.
29 The latter standard is drawn from Strickland v Washington 466 US 668 (1984) at 694, where it is the
standard for granting reliefbased on the 'ineffective assistance of counsel'.
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 327
Does this hold true even with a weaker definition of 'substantial injustice'?
Not if the definition is weak enough. If we defined 'substantial injustice' as
'any increment in the chance of conviction' then we might well say that some
increments were too small to merit freeing the convicted prisoner -but
really that would be because, after all, we do not view every such increment as a
substantial injustice. Where the injustice really is substantial, it may well be
simply unacceptable. In the words of one court, the state is 'irrefutably
presumed to be capable ofproviding such legal representation in cases where a
substantial injustice would otherwise occur'. 30
In this regard, it is worth pausing for a moment over the phrase 'substantial
injustice'. It would be tempting to read these words as, essentially, a
redundancy: what is prohibited is all injustice, because any injustice is
substantial. But this is not what the text says. It seems to tell us that in South
Africa there is such a thing as 'a little injustice', and that a little injustice is
constitutionally acceptable. 31 That statement is stark, but also quite realistic,
and not only in South Africa. If 'a little injustice' is acceptable, however,
something more - 'substantial injustice' - perhaps should not be, whatever
the proffered excuse for it.
This is especially the case because in a real sense the court is itself the author
of the injustice. It is the court that finds guilt and imposes sentence, or finds
liability and imposes a judgment, based on the events that amount to a
substantial injustice. Although all action may be state action in the sense that it
has some licence or support from the state, the South African Constitution
clearly embodies the view that some action belongs more to the state than
other action. 32 Some state action, similarly, belongs specially to courts and so, I
think, should be especially hard for courts to allow if it works 'substantial
injustice'.
In short, it seems to me that the Constitution tells South African courts to
pay only limited attention to cost in measuring whether a substantial injustice
exists in terms of s 35, or whether, if it exists, it is justified under s 36. This does
not mean that cost is irrelevant. Rights do cost money. Rather, what it says is
that the way for courts to honour the relevance of money to this right is to
apply the constitutional standard- substantial injustice - and with little
qualification. In effect, the Constitution, as I am reading it, has already
determined what the right to legal representation is worth, and has concluded
that it is worth the price required to prevent 'substantial injustice'. The best
way for courts to honour this judgement about the significance of costs is, at
least to a large extent, to not think about costs.
30 B v S 2003 (9) BCLR 955 (E) at 961H-I.
31 Perhaps, however, the opposite of 'substantial' is not 'a little' but 'insubstantial' in the sense of 'without
substance' or 'imaginary'. The strongest argument for my reading in text is not lexical but practical.
32 The Bill ofRights unambiguously binds the three branches of the government 'and all organs ofstate'
(s 8(1) ofthe Constitution and s 239 (defining 'organ ofstate')). Private actors are bound by the Bill of Rights
only 'if, and to the extent that, it is applicable' (s 8(2)). lfprivate actors were indistinguishable from state actors,
these different provisions would reduce to the same thing. CfStephen Ellmann 'A constitutional confluence:
American "state action" law and the application of South Africa's socio-economic rights guarantees to
private actors' in Penelope Andrews & Stephen Ellmann (eds) The Post-Apartheid Constitutions: Perspectives on
South Africa's Basic Law (2001) 444.
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Much of this logic applies, I believe, notjust in South Africa but also in the
United States. American courts are no more suited than their South African
counterparts to measurejustice by what the nation can afford, and they arejust
as suited as their South African counterparts to undertake, directly, an
assessment of what justice calls for in the cases that come before them. More
generally, it seems to me that the cogent demonstration by Holmes and
Sunstein that all rights have costs does not readily lead to the conclusion that
judges, as they adjudicate rights, should measure the dimensions of those
rights in light of their costs.
It is quite common, I suspect, that we carve complicated problems into
somewhat smaller or simplified parts, and ask decision-makers to address only
the sub-questions even though we are ultimately still interested in deciding
the full question at issue. In criminal cases, for example, we are ultimately
concerned to decide what to do with a particular accused - whether to free
him or to punish him, and, if punishment is what is called for, what punish-
ment to impose. This is the full problem a criminal court must resolve. But
American courts routinely (and of course rightly) break this problem apart,
and begin by deciding whether the accused is guilty. At that stage, quite a lot of
information about the accused's past behaviour and character will be kept out
of consideration because it might prejudice the decision on guilt. But that
same information will be entirely appropriate for consideration after
conviction, at the sentencing stage. So, too, rights adjudications may often
work best if considerations of cost are excluded, even though those
considerations are, in the end, always relevant.
Let me acknowledge two significant qualifications on this 'no-cost' reading
of the right to legal representation at state expense. First, to say that 'substantial
injustices' demand remedy, presses for a quite strict definition of substantial
injustice. In effect, the underlying constraint of costs 'leaks'into the definition
of substantial injustice. I accept this. It seems to me that the Constitution calls
on courts to think hard about justice, and that they are well equipped to do
this. Better for them to think seriously about what injustice isjust 'a little' and
what is 'substantial', than to try to focus on the question of whether injustice
that is substantial is justified by costs.
Secondly, this logic may not apply so fully to civil cases. If the several
provisions of the South African Constitution that explicitly promise access to
legal representation at state expense to avoid substantial injustice do 'cost out'
this right, as I have argued, there is no comparably explicit provision
governing civil cases. The provisions dealing with access to legal
representation provide both a specification of the right and a standard for
determining when it applies. In contrast, although the right to counsel can
readily be seen as implicit in s 34's guarantee of access to courts, 33 it is not
spelled out there. What is there is only a guarantee of a 'fair public hearing'.
This is an important guarantee, undoubtedly, and it can certainly be argued
33 Nkuzi supra note 5 presumably rests in part on s 34, although thejudgment does not explicitly say so.
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that 'fair' is, essentially, a synonym for 'just' and that therefore the standards
for the provision of counsel in civil and criminal cases should be essentially the
same. But 'fair' remains a vague term, and its very lack of precision makes it
seem a less definitive statement of the constitutional mandate than the
prohibition on 'substantial injustice'. It would be reasonable to infer that as a
result the courts retain more discretion to take costs into account in the broad
range of civil matters than in the criminal and children's cases where the right
to legal representation at state expense is explicit.
We can find some guidance about what courts might do with this
discretion in American case law. It must be said at once that United States cases
do not offer a single, consistent approach to the relevance of costs to the
determination of the extent of a constitutional right to legal representation at
state expense. In part, this is surely a function of the difference between our
constitutional text and South Africa's. The United States Constitution
nowhere explicitly guarantees a right to legal representation at state expense.
In addition, American constitutional rights are not, in general, explicitly
subject to limitation in the way that South African rights are by virtue of s 36.
As a result, not only must much more of the content of American rights be
inferred than would be necessary in South Africa, but the limitations on those
rights are generally made a part of the inferred content of the rights
themselves. There is, in short, more room in the United States constitutional
text for courts to factor costs into all of their decisions about the right to
counsel than I have found in the South African text.
That said, it also seems fair to say that the United States Supreme Court has
on occasion been prepared to recognize rights to representation at state
expense in criminal cases without much explicit reference to costs. 34 In
criminal cases, it is now settled in the United States that no one can be
sentenced to imprisonment, for any length of time, if he or she could not
afford counsel and was not offered counsel at state expense.35 There is a
modicum of textual basis for this, because the right 'to have the Assistance of
Counsel' is explicitly guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment. 36
34 See, for example, Gideon v Wainwright 372 US 335 (1963) (applying the right to appointed counsel to
the states, with no explicit consideration of costs, although issues of cost were briefed, see Brief of the
American Civil Liberties Union and the Florida Civil Liberties Union, Amici Curiae at 33-7, Gideon iv
Cochran decided sub notine Gideon v Wainwright 372 US 335 (1963) (No 155)); Ross v Moffitt 417 US 600
(1974) (refusing to extend the right to appointed counsel beyond the first appeal (as ofright) from conviction,
and basing this on an assessment of fairness to the accused, with only glancing reference to 'other claims for
public funds').But see Scott v Illinois 440 US 367 (1979) at 374 (refusing to extend right to appointed counsel
to misdemeanour trials not resulting in imprisonment,in part because 'any extension would create confusion
and impose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse States').
35 Argersinger v Hamlin 407 US 25 (1972). In Scott v Illinois supra note 34 at 373 the Supreme Court
characterized Argersinger as reaching its conclusion 'regardless of the cost to the States implicit in such a rule'.
Justice Powell's opinion in Argersinger (at 55-62), concurring in the result but not the opinion of the Court, is
much more concerned with the potential impact on the States.
36 This is not more than a 'modicum' of textual basis, however, for two reasons. First, the Sixth
Amendment does not explicitly refer to any right to counsel paid for by the state. Secondly, this amendment
as originally understood applied only to crimnal prosecutions by the federal government; its application to
prosecutions by state governments - the vast bulk of all prosecutions that take place - came about through
the 'incorporation' of this amendment's requirements under the rubric of the post-Civil War Fourteenth
Amendment's imposition of the requirement of due process on the states. Due process, however, does not
self-evidently embrace specific rules such as the right to counsel.
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In civil cases, on the other hand, all that is explicitly guaranteed is the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment right to 'due process of law'. The dimensions of
due process,in turn, are measured in these cases using a test that explicitly takes
into account the private interest at stake, the value of additional procedural
protections for the accuracy of the result in the matter, and the government
interests involved. Among those government interests are 'the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail'. 37
It seems to me that this test does not escape the problems with judicial
assessment of costs that I described earlier in this essay.38 Our courts, in
applying this test, cannot judge whether, globally, we can afford any given
protection. Nor does a measure for how much a protection will cost readily
convert to a measure of how much it is worth. For the reasons I have already
offered, I suggest that where the South African Constitution specifies a
standard of 'substantial injustice', the courts should not make cost
considerations a central part of their analysis. Nevertheless, where the
Constitution does not provide such relative clarity, it may be incumbent on
courts to take a more direct role in assessing the significance of the costs of
rights. When that is so, the Mathews v Eldridge39 schema offers a framework for
analysis.
MORE RESOURCES FOR MORE JUSTICE
Let me turn now to the second question: What should courts do about failures
to provide state-funded legal representation when those failures do breach the
Constitution?
South Africa already has certain doctrinal responses in place. It has a rule, or
at least a developing principle, that in the absence of counsel, the court is
obliged to assist the unrepresented litigant.40 Clearly this is an effort to prevent
substantial injustice in such cases. 41 I have to admit that, starting from the
American presumption in favour of counsel whenever an accused faces a
sentence of imprisonment, I am skeptical about the efficacy of such judicial
efforts. I am particularly uneasy because a focus on the judicial duty to assist
37 Mathews v Eldridge supra note 21 at 335. For an application of these factors to the question of
appointment of counsel at state expense, see Lassiter v Department of Social Services 452 US 18 (1981) at 28,
31-2 (deciding that parents facing termination of parental rights do not have an automatic right to
representation at state expense, though such representation may be required in individual cases - even
though the expense of providing such representation was 'admittedly de minimis compared to the costs in all
criminal actions').
31 For trenchant criticism of the case, urging attention to 'systematic concern with [due process] value'
in place of'the intuitive functionalism ofthe Eldridge opinion', see Mashaw supra note 21 at 30 and passim.
39 Supra note 37.
10 Frank Snyckers 'Criminal procedure' in Matthew Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa
(Revision Service 5, 1999) 27-60E.
41 American constitutional law too has sought to provide assistance to those not entitled to counsel. See
Bounds v Smith 430 US 817 (1977) at 828 (duty of prison authorities to provide inmates with 'adequate law
libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law').Efforts to engage candidate lawyers or even
law students in providing a measure of legal advice to people who would otherwise be entirely without
representation fill a similar function.
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the litigant tends to mean that the judge cannot find, substantial injustice
unless he finds his or her own efforts at assistance inadequate - and this
judges may be unhappy to do. But I do not have the first-hand knowledge to
assess how this rule works in practice.
When lawyers are supplied at state expense, however, the next question is
whether courts can ensure the adequacy of the representation they actually
offer. Again, I do not have first-hand knowledge of the quality of these South
African lawyers' work. I also mean no criticism whatsoever of their dedication
and effort. But it is my impression that they are often seriously overburdened,
and if this is so then it seems inevitable that the quality of their representation
of individual clients sometimes, or regularly, suffers. So what can courts do
about this?
The most obvious step is at once an identification of these cases and a
response to them. This is to adopt a doctrine of ineffective assistance of
counsel. In the United States,it is well settled that when a lawyer - state-paid
or privately retained 42 - renders constitutionally inadequate service that
prejudices the client's trial, the client's conviction must be overturned.43
South Africa does not have an articulated ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
doctrine. But such a doctrine does seem to be coming into being. In the case
of Charles v S,4 4 the Eastern Cape High Court ruled in 2002 that to comply
with the Constitution's provision for state-firnded counsel in s 35 (3)(g), 'legal
assistance to an accused person must be real, proper and designed to protect
the interests of the person so represented'. The only authority the court cited
was a decision finding a denial of a fair trial where the state-funded lawyer
could not speak the accused's language well enough to communicate with
him, 45 but the court said, essentially, that the failure to consult adequately with
the accused was .an even worse problem, and set aside his conviction and
sentence on appeal.
This is an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel case in all but name, and it has
already been followed.46 If this case helps to foster a body of South African
case law identifying, or at least sketching, the elements of effective
representation and assessing the significance of their absence, then over time
the courts will provide the country with an appraisal of the state of
representation by counsel. This appraisal may produce critical assessments of
the Legal Aid Board's lawyers; it may also produce critical assessments of some
privately retained counsel, and it may shed light on the implicit standards by
42 See Cuyler v Sullivan 446 US 335 (1980) at 342-5.
13 Strickland v Washington 466 US 668 (1984).
44 [2002] 3 All SA 471 (E) at 475f-g.
41 S v Pienaar2000 (2) SACR 143 (NC);2000 (7) BCLR 800 (NC) (decision in Afrikaans). The Editor's
Summary, on which I must rely, reports that in this case the failure to advise the accused ofhis right to a lawyer
with whom he could communicate, and his subsequent decision to conduct his own defence, 'amounted to a
denial of the accused's right to legal representation'.
46 See B v S 2003 (9) BCLR 955 (E) at 963. This case too sets aside a conviction because of ineffective
assistance of counsel, and invokes the Charles judgment (supra note 44) as amply illustrating the courts'
concern 'not only ... with the fact of legal representation, but also by the adequacy thereof' (emphasis in
original).
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which judges assess the fairness of cases in which they seek to assist
unrepresented accused people to defend themselves. In addition, a remedy
will be available in each case in which substantial injustice is found, taking the
form of the setting aside of the convictions, or civil judgments, that resulted. I
think it is important for South Africa's courts to move in this direction;
indeed, I do not see how else cases can be assessed, and if need be remedied,
under the 'substantial injustice' standard.
In the United States, however, this remedy does not seem to have been
enough. In part this may be because it is not a simple task to establish standards
that can readily be applied to assess the adequacy of counsel's performance;
these assessments are often, inescapably, contextual a 7 No doubt it is also true,
in the United States as well as South Africa, that it is hard for judges to release
people they believe to be guilty.48 There is also room for concern, which the
Supreme Court has expressed, that the tasks of representing criminal
defendants not be made too perilous for the lawyers who undertake them.
49
In any event, the Supreme Court's Strickland v Washington standard for
ineffective assistance of counsel is intentionally deferential. This test
establishes 'a strong presumption that counsel's performance falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance'. 50 Even where that presump-
tion is overcome, the defendant challenging counsel's performance must also
show prejudice, or harm, to his case: 'a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different'. 51 These standards have been repeatedly attacked as much too
indulgent of lawyers' incompetence. In the words of one critic, under this
standard 'a lawyer need not be awake, sober, prepared, knowledgeable, or
sensible, at least in the large number of cases where courts find no prejudice'. 52
At the same time, there is, unfortunately, considerable reason to believe that
state-funded criminal defence lawyers in the United States are, as their South
African counterparts may be, so overburdened that they are liable to render
ineffective assistance to their clients.5 3
What then can be done? Contrary to popular belief, American courts in
some contexts are by no means hostile to socio-economic rights claims, and
the decisions of several state courts in the United States offer signposts that
11 See Adele Bernhard 'Take courage: What the courts can do to improve the delivery of criminal
defense services' (2002) 63 Univ of Pittsburgh LR 293 at 336-8; WiliamJ Stuntz 'The uneasy relationship
between criminal procedure and criminal justice' (1997) 107 Yale LJ 1 at 70.
48 See Bernhard op cit note 47 at 311 (discussing the 'unacknowledged but pervasive belief [among
judges, lawyers and others in the criminal justice system] that anyone who has been arrested is guilty').
49 See Strickland v Washington supra note 43 at 697. This concern for the burdens on counsel is forceful if
counsel's shortcomings are the result of systemic problems, such as overwhelming caseloads, for which
individual lawyers are not responsible. It is less cogent where what is at issue is avoidable misconduct.
so At 689.
s1 At 694.
12 Marc L Miller 'Book review: Wise masters' (1999) 51 Stanford LR 1751 at 1786-7 (footnotes
omitted).
53 See Stuntz op cit note 48 at 76 (commenting that making the right to state-funded counsel 'a formal
right only, without any ancillary funding requirements, has produced a criminal process that is, for poor
defendants, a scandal').
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South African courts - commonly seen as less hesitant about socio-
economic rights in general - might ultimately need to follow in order to
ensure that the true costs ofhonouring the right to legal representation at state
expense are met.
s4
Consider, for example, the case of State v Leonard Peart,55 a decision of the
Supreme Court of Louisiana. The trial court in Peart had held a hearing based
on a motion by Peart's lawyer, a man named Rick Teissier. The court found
the following:
'At the time of his appointment, Teissier was handling 70 active felony cases. His clients are
routinely incarcerated 30 to 70 days before he meets with them. In the period between
January 1 and August 1, 1991, Teissier represented 418 defendants. Of these, he entered 130
guilty pleas at arraignment. He had at least one serious case ... set for trial for every trial date
during that period. OIDP [Teissier's employer] has only enough funds to hire three
investigators. They are responsible for rendering assistance in more than 7,000 cases per year
in the ten sections of Criminal District Court,plus cases injuvenile Court,Traffic Court, and
Magistrates' Court. In a routine case Teissier receives no investigative support at all. There are
no funds for expert witnesses. OIDP's library is inadequate.'
56
On the basis of this evidence, the trial court found the entire system of
providing counsel for indigent defendants in New Orleans unconstitutional.
The Louisiana Supreme Court did not go so far. In a judgment with a notably
political flavor, the court found the appointed counsel system only 'generally'
unconstitutional, and only in the particular court ('Section E'of New Orleans'
Criminal District Court) where Peart's case had been brought.5 7 Then it
imposed 'a rebuttable presumption' that, in the absence of changes in this
system, future defendants in this court 'are receiving assistance of counsel not
sufficiently effective to meet constitutionally required standards'.58 What that
meant was that the trial court would have to hold individual hearings on the
motion of any such defendant, and '[i]f the court, applying this presumption
and weighing all evidence presented, finds that Leonard Peart or any other
defendant in Section E is not receiving the reasonably effective assistance of
counsel the constitution requires, and the court finds itself unable to order any
other relief which would remedy the situation, then the court shall not permit
the prosecution to go forward until the defendant is provided with reasonably
effective assistance of counsel'.s9
s4 I focus here on the role of the courts. In daily practice, the role of lawyers is at least as important, for
they will inevitably find themselves giving effect, in individual cases, to the overall societal level ofsupport for
their function, whether that support is adequate or parched. Well-trained and well-supervised lawyers can
handle their demanding roles better than novices practising with little oversight. But how shall these lawyers
practise? Ifthey do not have time to do all that they should, they must decide what to forgo; seriously assessing
what choices must be made is essential, at the same time that it runs the risk of deteriorating into a form of
acquiescence in an unacceptable state of affairs. For thoughtful exploration of these issues, see Darryl K
Brown 'Rationing criminal defense entitlements: An argument from institutional design' (2004) 104
Columbia LR 801 at 816-28.




51 At 791-2. For another case similarly establishing 'an inference that the adequacy of representation is
adversely affected' as long as the defender system is not reformed, see State v Smith 681 P2d 1374 (Az 1984) at
1381. Florida's Supreme Court threatened an even more drastic step - prisoner release. It decided, in a case
finding unconstitutional shortfalls in the funding of indigent criminal appeals, that: 'although this Court may
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The Louisiana court's approach stays close to the courts' central area of
expertise and of responsibility - the assurance that individual cases do not
result in substantial injustice. It would seem to be doctrinally within the reach
of a court applying ineffective-assistance-of-counsel principles. But it is
reasonably clear that what the court was doing was using its presumption of
unconstitutionality, and threat to stay pending cases, as a bludgeon, or a
symbol, to pressure the state legislature to act.60 I do not know whether, or for
how long, any cases were actually stayed, but in the following years Louisiana
restructured its indigent counsel programme and increased its funding. 61 .
Another approach, however, moves explicitly into the realm of money.
Consider the response of the state courts of New York to what they saw as a
crisis in indigent representation, brought on by rates of compensation for
appointed counsel so low that (the courts felt) the rates discouraged counsel
from accepting appointments and from working hard on the appointments
they did take. The limits may sound high to a South African ear: $40 per hour
for in-court work, and $25 per hour for out-of-court work, with a cap of
$1 200 in felony cases absent 'extraordinary circumstances'. 62 But the courts'
concern was, I think, entirely plausible, in light of evidence about the rates'
actual impact on counsel's availability and performance; in view of the sheer
mathematics, which indicated that the statutory cap would be reached
anytime a lawyer worked for 16 hours out of court, and 20 hours in court; and
in consideration of financial evidence that overhead expenses for a solo
attorney in New York might be $60 000 per year. 63 As a result, courts in the
state apparently began 'routinely ignor[ing] the cap';that is, they compensated
lawyers for the time actually spent, despite the statutory cap.64 A number of
judges concluded that the funding crisis put so much pressure on the
adequacy of representation that every case would count as extraordinary.65
Finally, early in 2003, a New York State trial court concluded explicitly
that the low rates 'result[ed] in denial of counsel, delay in proceedings,
excessive caseloads, and inordinate intake and arraignment, shifts; further
resulting in rendering less than meaningful and effective assistance of counsel,
and impairment of the judiciary's ability to function'.66 The State and City
not be able to order the legislature to appropriate those [needed] funds, we must advise the legislature that if
sufficient finds are not appropriated within sixty days from the filing of this opinion, and counsel hired and
appearances filed within 120 days from the filing of this opinion, the courts ofthis state will entertain motions
for writs of habeas corpus from those indigent appellants whose appellate briefs are delinquent sixty days or
more, and upon finding merit to those petitions, will order the immediate release pending appeal of indigent
convicted felons who are otherwise bondable.' In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth
Judicial Circuit Public Defender 561 So 2d 1130 (Ha 1990) at 1139.
60 The dissentingjustice wrote that '[e]vidently,my colleagues intend to offer up Section E as a lamb for
burnt offering, hoping that an all-knowing, benevolent deity will miraculously cure the ills of the indigent
defense system in that section and perhaps elsewhere' (621 So 2d 780 at 792 (Dennis J, dissenting)).
61 Miller op cit note 52 at 1795.
62 NY County Law s 722-b (McKinney 1991);NY Fans Ct Acts 245 (McKinney 1999); NYjud Law
s 35 (McKinney 2002).
63 New York County Lawyers'Association v New York 793 NYS 2d 397 (Sup Ct,NY Cty,2003) at 416-17,
appeal withdrawn 767 NYS 2d 603 (App Div'1st Dept 2003).
64 State v Bernard Thompson 2003 NY Misc LEXIS 11 at *4 (Sup Ct, Bronx Cry, 2003).
6s People v Branch 2001 NY Misc LEXIS 507 at *6-7 (Sup Ct, Queens Cty, 2001).
66 New York County Lawyers' Association 793 NYS 2d at 400.
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argued 'that injunctive relief should not issue until the Legislature has been
given an opportunity to act'. 67 The court, however, was convinced that the
legislature had already been given more than enough time - this issue
having been a subject of prolonged, ineffectual political effort in the state.
Therefore, the court 'issue[d] a mandatory injunction raising the rates to $90
an hour, without distinction between in and out-of-court work, and without
ceilings on total per case compensation, until the Legislature addresses the
issue'. 68 All of this was quite striking, but not unique, for other states have also
directly regulated the levels of compensation for assigned counsel.6
9
.Could a South African court issue orders of these sorts - staying all
pending cases in a particular court, for example, pending legislative reform of
the system ofprovision of counsel to indigents, or simply ordering the State to
pay to the Legal Aid Board an additional R500 million, to be used for hiring,
training and providing support services to additional lawyers for indigent
South Africans? In principle, it seems to me that the answer should be 'yes'.
There is no doubt, I take it, that South African courts can issue monetary
judgments against the state, for damages and for costs. Equally there is no
doubt that the courts can order the government to undertake programmes
that will cost money and that may well divert money from other potential
programmes, as in, for example, Grootboom. Because orders of the kind I am
describing would deal, in a sense, with the courts' own operations, they would
rest not only on the courts' general remedial powers but also in part on the
courts' authority 'to protect and regulate their own process'. 70 The courts
could also invoke the constitutional duties of all other organs of state to avoid
interfering with the courts71 and to 'assist and protect the courts to ensure
[their] independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness'. 72 In
67 At 418.
68 At 419. A federal court had also ruled, in 2002, that mothers facing removal of their children were
entitled to appointed counsel, compensated at $90 per hour up to a maximum, ordinarily, of$1 500 per case
(In re Shanwline Nicholson 181 F Supp 2d 182 (EDNY 2002) at 192). The Second Circuit United StatesCourt
of Appeals recently postponed assessment of the correctness of this decision pending guidance on issues of
state law from the New York Court ofAppeals (Nicholson v Scoppetta 344 F 3d 154 (2d Cir 2003) at 158nl).
Some months after the New York County Lawyers' Association decision the New York state legislature did
address the issue, setting somewhat lower rates than the court had ordered; the paries to the lawsuit agreed to
a settlement incorporating the legislature's chosen rates. Daniel Wise 'Assigned counsel fee ltigaton is
settled: County lawyers agrees to lower hourly rate set by legislature; benefits of previous rulings preserved'
New York LJ (13 November 2003) 1. The debate over the state of New York's indigent representation system
continues. See John Caher 'Defenders' group documents 18-B from poor defendants' point of view' New
York LJ (14 October 2003) 1.
69 See State v Lynch 796 P2d 1150 (Ok 1990) (finding Oklahoma rates of compensation for appointed
counsel so low as to be an unconstitutional taking of the attorneys' property; for the subsequent reforms
enacted by the Oklahoma legislature, see Miller op cit note 52 at 1801). See also In the Matter oftthe Recorder's
Court Bar Association et al v Wayne Circuit Court et al 503 NW 2d 885 (Mich 1993) (Michigan State Supreme
Court finding that a local compensation system set by a lower court violated a state statutory requirement of
'reasonable compensation').
70 Section 173 of the Constitution.
71 Section 165(3). See also s 165(1), which provides that '[tihejudicial authority ofthe Republic is vested
in the courts'.
72 Section 165(4). Some American courts, similarly, have invoked their general power to supervise the
legal profession and legal proceedings as a basis for their orders. Lynch supra note 69 at 1162; cfRecorders'Court
Bar Association 503 NW 2d at 897 ('Court's extraordinary power of superintending control' over lower
court).
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short, the orders I have reported from American state courts do not seem, in
principle, to rest on forms ofjudicial authority unavailable to South Africa's
courts. Nor do they emerge from courts indifferent to the sensitivity of such
judicial demands upon the political branches - for American courts if
anything may sometimes be more hesitant on this score than South African
courts are.
At the same time, these are very drastic steps to take. Even if I am right that
courts should assess the presence of 'substantial injustice' largely without
attention to the question of what justice might cost, they clearly could not
issue orders like these without directly addressing the issues of costs and,
correspondingly, of spending priorities. They are not well positioned to do so.
This obvious reality suggests that two other courses of action will make better
sense.
First, here as in other areas where courts may need to intrude into
executive and legislative decision-making to vindicate constitutional rights,
they should first intrude as little as possible. Faced with a court system in
which inadequate representation was endemic, the first step might be just to
say so, to urge the government to address the problem (perhaps simply as a
matter of wise policy rather than explicitly announced legal duty) and then to
await government steps to remedy the problem.73 The next step might be to
require the government to offer a remedy, and then to monitor its
implementation. Another step of this sort might be to require the government
and the litigants challenging it to try to agree on a remedy, and order their
agreement into effect. Even when courts take the further step of ordering a
plan into effect based on the outcome of an adversary hearing rather than of
negotiation, they may do so without directly ordering particular levels of
funding. Steps such as these limit the extent of the courts' intrusion into
political decision-making, and can also provide the basis for more drastic
intervention if it is necessary.
It must also be said, however, that orders like these can be sharp, and
long-term, constraints on the political branches. That may be just what is
needed, where the government is resisting compliance with its obligations.
Yet it may also turn out that reforms ordered at one stage, perhaps even on the
basis of consent by all parties, ultimately become unreasonable constraints on
future, needed change. Suppose, for example, that the court orders a particular
system of supplying appointed counsel, and some years later the government
comes to believe that another system would do the same job equally well, but
more cheaply. American courts have wrestled with the questions of when
73 Nkuzi supra note 5 para 12 adopts essentially this stance, ordering that legal representation be made
available but not specifying the programmatic steps that would have to be taken to accomplish this (declaring
that '[t]he State is under a duty to provide such legal representation or legal aid through mechanisms selected
by it'). For an example of a court urging steps as a matter ofpolicy rather than law, see Lassitersupra note 37 at
33-4, in which the Supreme Court, while deciding that the Constitution did not automatically guarantee a
right to counsel at state expense to parents facing termination of their parental rights, at the same time made
clear its view that 'wise public policy' would provide counsel not only in these cases but in other related
proceedings as well.
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courts' 'structural' interventions into governmental operations can be recon-
sidered, and on what showing, and these issues may need to be addressed in
South Africa as well. 74
Secondly, it may be that courts should not now initiate this series of
interventions and perhaps then of reconsiderations. This is, in one sense, a
startling suggestion. United States courts oversee a vastly more expensive
effort to implement the right to appointed counsel than South Africa has yet
undertaken, and yet a number of those courts have found the expensive
systems in place constitutionally unacceptable and have intervened quite
forcefully. Yet I am suggesting that in South Africa the time is not yet ripe for
such intervention. This is so for several reasons. For one thing, the
groundwork has not yet been laid, in the form of an accumulation of court
decisions defining effective assistance of counsel and acknowledging its
absence (if indeed it is absent). Sweepingjudicial intervention is a drastic step,
and certainly not the first one to take. In addition, the choices that must be
made about spending priorities are, I think, much harder in South Africa than
in the United States; needs are greater in South Africa and resources are less.
Choosing what to do in such painful circumstances is a quintessentially
democratic, rather than judicial, task - to be sure, within the boundaries set
by the Constitution.
Perhaps most important is the fact that the political process has responded
quite vigorously to the problems of lack of representation in South Africa's
courts. In the United States, representation of indigent criminal defendants
may seem like the last thing that most elected officials would make a priority.75
Whether politicians' priorities are different in South Africa, or whether this
issue has (happily) escaped from the focus of politicians whose priorities are
elsewhere, the Legal Aid Board has, in recent years, rescued itself from
financial disarray and dramatically restructured its method of providing legal
services, abandoning a system of case-by-case appointment of counsel in
favour of preferred use of lawyers from justice centres established around the
country.76 It has also adopted regulations that in effect give 'substantial
injustice' a very wide definition, embracing all criminal cases where a sentence
of three months is probable77 - a definition much more inclusive than any
court, as far as I know, has adopted so far. Legal Aid services are also available to
clients in a wide range of civil matters, again well beyond what the
7i My colleagues Ross Sandier and David Schoenbrod have thoughtfully explored these problems,
though I am less wary ofjudicial power than they are. See Ross Sandler & David Schoenbrod Democracy By
Decree: Wiat Happens Wien Courts Run Government (2003).
75 One possible response to such political realities is to confer funding authority on the courts. For an
illustration of a statutory system in NewJersey that gives the courts authority to increase appropriations for
prosecutors despite the decision of the relevant local government to appropriate less, see In the Matter of the
Application of A Donald Bigley, Camden County Prosecutorfor the Appointment ofAdditional Assistant Prosecutors
and the Incurring of Other Expenses 259 A 2d 213 (NJ 1969). It would ofcourse be open to South Africa to vest
similar authority, for prosecution or defence funding, in its courts or in some other agency removed from
direct political pressures.
76 See, for example, South African Press Association 'Govt-funded justice centre to serve
poverty-stricken people' 7 February 2001 (available on LEXIS).
77 Legal Aid Guide op cit note 7 para 3.1.1.
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Constitution's text specifically calls for.78 My understanding is that the Board
is now moving to implement training programmes for its lawyers, certainly
another needed step. 79 There is a lot to be done, but also reason to believe the
Board is doing it.
Is there a doctrinal basis on which South African courts could refrain from
intervening systemically even if they come to see that the provision of counsel
has systemic problems? Section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution would seem to
say that courts cannot refrain from calling 'any law or conduct'
unconstitutional if it is so. But s 172(1)(b)(ii) allows the courts to 'make any
order that is just and equitable, including ... an order suspending the declara-
tion of invalidity for any period and on any conditions, to allow the competent
authority to correct the defect'. It may be that, in dealing with the adequacy of
representation and perhaps a number of other painful problems South Africa
faces, the courts will need to rely on this power. Thus, the ultimate judicial
response to this aspect of the task of ensuring access to justice may turn out to
be vigilant case-by-case adjudication, combined with reliance on other
government actors for systemic improvements. One reason that approach may
work, finally, is that all parties will no doubt be aware that courts have much
more incisive remedies available to them if co-operative responses fail.
11 See note 8 above.
79 Brits op cit note 9.
